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11 Introduction
We consider the implementation of allocation rules in production economies
with possibly unequal labor skills among individuals. Varian (1994), Hur-
wicz et al. (1995), Hong (1995), Suh (1995), Tian (1999, 2000), Yoshihara
(1999), and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) have proposed simple or natural
mechanisms (game forms) to implement particular rules such as the Wal-
rasian solution and the proportional solution (Roemer and Silvestre (1993)).
In contrast, a few works such as Shin and Suh (1997) and Yoshihara (2000)
have discussed characterizations of allocation rules implementable by such
simple or natural mechanisms. However, in these works, there are two im-
plicit assumptions about the basic information structure among individuals
and the social planner (or mechanism coordinator).
The ﬁrst implicit assumption is that the planner knows every individual’s
level of labor skill, or alternatively that all individuals have the same skill
level. Thus, the main problem of asymmetric information in this structure
is reduced to the possibility of misrepresenting each individual’s preference
ordering,1 and at most, the possibility of understating each individual’s en-
dowment of material goods.2 However, if individual skill levels diﬀer, it is
more natural to consider an informational structure such that the planner
cannot know each individual’s true skill, which gives the individual an incen-
tive to overstate, or to understate, his own skill. Note that the possibility
of overstating individual skill is an essential feature of production economies
with asymmetric information, because the planner cannot require individuals
to “place the claimed endowments on the table” (Hurwicz et al. (1995)) in
advance of production. Thus, taking this feature of the problem into con-
sideration, our concern in this paper is to characterize the class of allocation
rules, each of which assigns a subset of Pareto eﬃcient allocations to each
economic environment, that are implementable by a natural mechanism even
when individuals’ skills are unknown to the planner.
What kind of mechanism should we take as a natural one in this context?
This issue is relevant to our discussion of the second implicit assumption
in the present literature on implementation in production economies. Al-
though Shin and Suh (1997) and Yoshihara (2000) deﬁne the conditions for
1For instance, Varian (1994), Suh (1995), Shin and Suh (1997), Yoshihara (1999, 2000),
and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) discussed this type of problem.
2For instance, Hurwicz et al. (1995), Hong (1995), and Tian (1999, 2000) discussed
this type of problem.
2characterizing “natural mechanisms” in production economies, the list of
those conditions3 is not yet satisfactory, because they omit another impor-
tant feature of production economies with asymmetric information. Usually,
the mechanisms in the implementation literature consist of pairs of strategy
spaces and outcome functions, where each agent is required to state some
i n f o r m a t i o n ,a n dt h eo u t c o m ef u n c t i o na s s i g n sa na l l o c a t i o nt oe a c hp r o ﬁle
of individuals’ strategies. So, in production economies where one of the main
productive factors is labor, it is implicitly assumed that the planner is au-
thorized to force individuals to provide the amount of labor assigned by the
outcome function of the mechanism.4 However, the planner may not have
such authority.
To solve this problem, we introduce another condition, labor sovereignty
(Kranich (1994)), for characterizing “natural mechanisms” in production
economies, and we propose sharing mechanisms a sat y p eo fg a m ef o r m
satisfying labor sovereignty. Labor sovereignty requires that every individual
should have a right to choose his own labor time. In a sharing mechanism,
each individual can freely supply his labor time, and the individual is asked
to give information concerning his skill and demand for consumption goods.
The outcome function simply distributes the produced output to agents, ac-
cording to the information they provided and the record of their labor hours
completed.
Thus, the question this paper addresses is: what kinds of rules that assign
some Pareto eﬃcient allocations are implementable by sharing mechanisms,
even when individuals’ skills are unknown to the planner? We consider three
equilibrium notions, Nash, strong Nash,a n dsubgame perfect Nash,f o rt h e
non-cooperative games deﬁned by sharing mechanisms.5 We identify two
axioms that characterize rules triply implementable by sharing mechanisms.
T h et w oa x i o m sa r er e l e v a n tt ot h ee t h i c a lp r i n c i p l e so fresponsibility and
compensation (Fleurbaey (1998)) in fair allocation problems. Thus, our char-
acterization provides an insight into the implementability of fair allocation
3Those conditions are feasibility, forthrightness, best response property,a n dsimple strat-
egy spaces, which were originally proposed by Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1995) and Saijo,
Tatamitani, and Yamato (1996) to characterize “natural mechanisms” in pure exchange
economies.
4Roemer (1989) pointed out this implicit assumption explicitly.
5Yamada and Yoshihara (2002) proposed a sharing mechanism that triply imple-
ments the proportional solution in these three equilibria, when the production function is
diﬀerentiable.
3rules in terms of responsibility and compensation.
In the following discussion, the model is deﬁned in Section 2. Section 3
provides a characterization of triple implementation by sharing mechanisms.
Section 4 gives some samples of implementable and non-implementable rules.
Concluding remarks appear in Section 5. All proofs of the theorems are
relegated to the Appendix.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
T h e r ea r et w og o o d s ,o n eo fw h i c hi sa ni n p u t( l a b o rt i m e )x ∈ R+ to be
used to produce the other good y ∈ R+.6 The population is given by the
set N = {1,...,n},w h e r e2 ≤ n<+∞. Each agent i0s consumption is
denoted by zi =( xi,y i),w h e r exi denotes his labor time, and yi denotes the
amount of his output. All the agents are assumed to face a common upper
bound of labor time ¯ x ,w h e r e0 < ¯ x<+∞, so that they have the same
consumption set [0, ¯ x]×R+. Each agent i0s preference is deﬁned on [0, ¯ x]×R+
and represented by a utility function ui :[ 0 , ¯ x]×R+ → R which is continuous
and quasi-concave on [0, ¯ x]×R+, and strictly monotonic (decreasing in labor
time and increasing in the share of output) on [0, ¯ x) × R++.7 We use U
to denote the class of such utility functions. In addition, each agent i is
characterized by a labor skill, which is represented by a positive real number
st
i ∈ R++. The superscript t on st
i indicates “true,” so that st
i denotes agent
i0st r u es k i l l . The universal set of skills for all agents is denoted by S = R++.8
The labor skill st
i ∈ S is i0s labor supply p e rh o u rm e a s u r e di ne ﬃciency units.
It can also be interpreted as i0s labor intensity exercised in the production
process.9 Thus, if the agent’s labor time is xi ∈ [0, ¯ x] and his labor intensity
6The symbol R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
7The symbol R++ denotes the set of positive real numbers.
8For any two sets X and Y , X ⊆ Y whenever any x ∈ X also belongs to Y ,a n dX = Y
if and only if X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X.
9It might be more natural to deﬁne labor skill and labor intensity in a discriminative
way: for example, if st
i ∈ S is i’s labor skill, then i’s labor intensity is a variable st
i,w h e r e
0 <s t
i ≤ st
i. In such a formulation, we may view the amount of st
i as being determined
endogenously by the agent i. In spite of this more natural view, we will assume in the
following discussion that the labor intensity is a constant value, st
i = st
i, for the sake
of simplicity. The main theorems in the following discussion would remain valid with a
few changes in the settings of the economic environments even if the labor intensity were
assumed to be varied.
4is st
i ∈ S,t h e nst
ixi ∈ R+ denotes the agent’s labor contribution to the
production process measured in eﬃciency units. The production technology
is a function f : R+ → R+, assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing,
concave, and f (0) = 0. For simplicity, we ﬁxt h i sf for all economies.
Thus, the economy is characterized by a pair of proﬁles e ≡ (u,st) with
u =( u1,...,u n) ∈ Un and st =( st
1,...,s t
n) ∈ Sn.D e n o t et h ec l a s so fs u c h
economies by E ≡ Un ×S n.
Given st =( st
1,...,s t
n) ∈ Sn, an allocation z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n
is feasible for st if
P
yi ≤ f (
P
st
ixi).W ed e n o t eb yZ (st) the set of feasible
allocations for st ∈ Sn.A n a l l o c a t i o n z =( z1,...,z n) ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n is
Pareto eﬃcient for e =( u,st) ∈ E if z ∈ Z (st) and there does not exist
z0 =( z0
1,...,z0
n) ∈ Z (st) such that for all i ∈ N, ui (z0
i) ≥ ui (zi),a n df o r
some i ∈ N, ui (z0
i) >u i (zi).W eu s eP (e) to denote the set of Pareto eﬃcient
allocations for e ∈ E.Asolution is a correspondence ϕ : E ³ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n
such that for each e =( u,st) ∈ E, ϕ(e) ⊆ Z (st). A solution is called a
Pareto subsolution if for each e ∈ E, ϕ(e) ⊆ P (e). Given a Pareto subsolu-
tion ϕ, an allocation z ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n is ϕ-optimal for e ∈ E if z ∈ ϕ(e).
2.1 Sharing Mechanisms
We are interested in mechanisms having the property of labor sovereignty,
under which every agent can choose his own labor time freely. In particular,
we focus on sharing mechanisms that simply distribute output among the
agents according to their announcements on private information and their
supplied labor time.
Deﬁnition 1. A sharing mechanism is a function g : M ×[0, ¯ x]
n → Rn
+ such
that for any (m,x) ∈ M × [0, ¯ x]
n, g(m,x)=y for some y ∈ Rn
+,w h e r e
m =( m1,...,m n) denotes the agents’ messages.
A sharing mechanism g is feasible if for each st ∈ Sn,e a c hm ∈ M,a n d
each x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n,w eh a v e(x,g(m,x)) ∈ Z (st). Note that a feasible sharing






We denote by G the class of all (feasible sharing) mechanisms.
Given a mechanism g ∈ G,a( feasible) sharing game is deﬁned for each
economy e ∈ E as a non-cooperative game (N,M × [0, ¯ x]
n ,g,e). Fixing the
set of players N and their strategy sets M × [0, ¯ x]
n,w es i m p l yd e n o t ea
feasible sharing game (N,M × [0, ¯ x]
n ,g,e) by (g,e).







∈ M ×[0, ¯ x]
n
be another strategy proﬁle that is obtained by replacing the i-th component
(mi,x i) of (m,x) with (m0
i,x 0
i).As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (m∗,x∗) ∈ M ×[0, ¯ x]
n is a
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the sharing game (g,e) if for any i ∈ N
and any (mi,x i) ∈ Mi × [0, ¯ x], ui (x∗









Denote by NE(g,e) the set of Nash equilibria of (g,e). An allocation z =
(xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n is a Nash equilibrium allocation of the sharing
game (g,e) if there exists m ∈ M such that (m,x) ∈ NE(g,e) and y =
g(m,x),w h e r ex =( xi)i∈N and y =( yi)i∈N.W eu s eNA(g,e) to denote the
set of Nash equilibrium allocations of (g,e).Am e c h a n i s mg ∈ G implements
as o l u t i o nϕ on E in Nash equilibria if for all e ∈ E, NA(g,e)=ϕ(e).
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (m∗,x∗) ∈ M×[0, ¯ x]
n is a (pure-strategy) strong (Nash)
equilibrium of the sharing game (g,e) if for any T ⊆ N and any (mi,x i)i∈T ∈
(Mi)i∈T × [0, ¯ x]




















We use SNE(g,e) to denote the set of strong equilibria of (g,e). An alloca-
tion z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
n is a strong equilibrium allocation of the
sharing game (g,e) if there exists m ∈ M such that (m,x) ∈ SNE(g,e)
and y = g(m,x).W eu s eSNA(g,e) to denote the set of strong equilibrium
allocations of (g,e).A m e c h a n i s m g ∈ G implements as o l u t i o nϕ on E in
strong equilibria, if for all e ∈ E, SNA(g,e)=ϕ(e).
2.2 The Timing Problem with Sharing Mechanisms
We should mention here that m and x represent the agents’ diﬀerent kinds
of strategic actions: m indicates the agents’ announcements on their private
information, whereas x indicates their production activity from supplying
labor time. Thus, there may be a diﬀerence between the point in time when
m is announced and the time when x is exercised. It implies that there may
be at least two polar opposite time sequences of decision making:t h ea g e n t s
may announce m before they engage in production, or they may announce
m after supplying x. The former enables each agent i to decide his supply
of labor time with knowledge of the announcements m, whereas the latter
10For any T ⊆ N, #T denotes the number of agents in T. For any T ⊆ N, Tc denotes
the complement of T in N.
6enables each agent i to decide his announcement mi with knowledge of the
agents’ actions x in the production process.
Additionally, we should consider at least two types of two-stage game
forms:
(1) In the ﬁrst type of two-stage game form, every agent i simultaneously
makes an announcement, mi,i nt h eﬁrst stage on his private information,
and in the second stage, every agent i engages in production and provides his
labor time, xi. After the production process, the outcome function assigns a
distribution of the output produced.
(2) The second type of two-stage game form has the reverse sequence of
strategic actions. In the ﬁrst stage, every agent i engages in production and
provides his labor time, xi, and after production takes place, every agent i
simultaneously makes an announcement, mi, on his private information in
the second stage. Finally, the outcome function assigns a distribution of the
output produced.
Given a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G,t h eﬁr s tt y p eo ft h eg-implicit
two-stage extensive game form is a feasible mechanism Γm`x
g in which the
ﬁrst stage consists of selecting m ∈ M, the second stage consists of selecting
x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n,a n dt h eﬁnal stage assigns an outcome (x,g(m,x)).G i v e ng ∈ G,
the second type of the g-implicit two-stage extensive game form is a feasible
mechanism Γx`m
g in which the ﬁrst stage consists of selecting x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n,
the second stage consists of selecting m ∈ M,a n dt h eﬁnal stage assigns an
outcome (x,g(m,x)).





and a strategy proﬁle m ∈ M in the






.L e txs : M → [0, ¯ x]
n be a strategy mapping such that for











by X.As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle
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i (m) (resp. xs
i (m))i st h ei-th component of the strategy proﬁle
xs∗ (m) (resp. xs (m)) in the second-stage subgame induced by the strategy
choice m in the ﬁrst stage.





and a strategy proﬁle x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n in the






.L e tms :[ 0 , ¯ x]
n → M be a strategy mapping such that for
each x ∈ [0, ¯ x]











by Ms.A s t r a t e g y
proﬁle (ms∗,x∗) ∈ Ms × [0, ¯ x]
n is a (pure-strategy) subgame perfect (Nash)





if for any i ∈ N and any xi ∈ [0, ¯ x],a n y




























and ui (xi,g i (m












) to denote the set of sub-










). An allocation z =
(xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ([0, ¯ x] × R+)
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Given g ∈ G, the two-stage mechanism Γm`x
g (resp. Γx`m
g ) implements as o -











= ϕ(e)). Given g ∈ G, the two-stage mechanism
Γm`x
g (resp. Γx`m
g ) triply implements as o l u t i o nϕ on E in Nash, strong,













3 Implementation by Sharing Mechanisms
Throughout our discussion, we assume that each agent prefers consumption
vectors with positive amounts of output and leisure, over consumption vectors
w i t h o u to u t p u to rl e i s u r e .
Assumption 1 (boundary condition of utility functions):
∀i ∈ N,∀zi ∈ [0, ¯ x) × R++,∀z
0
i ∈ ∂ ([0, ¯ x] × R+),u i (zi) >u i (z
0
i).11
11∂ ([0, ¯ x] × R+) ≡ ([0, ¯ x] × R+) \ ([0, ¯ x) × R++).
8Here, let us introduce a new notation. We denote the set of price vectors
by the unit simplex ∆ ≡ {p =( px,p y) ∈ R+ × R+ : px + py =1 },w h e r epx
represents the price of labor (measured in eﬃciency units) and py is the
price of output. The message space M of the mechanism considered in
the present paper is deﬁned by M ≡ ∆n ×S n × Rn
+, with generic element
(p,s,w),w h e r ep =( p1,...,p n),i nw h i c hpi denotes i’s reported price vec-
tor, s =( s1,...,s n),i nw h i c hsi denotes i’s reported amount of skill, and
w =( w1,...,w n),i nw h i c hwi denotes i’s desired amount of output. More-
over, we deﬁne eﬃciency prices as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. A price vector p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆ is an eﬃciency price for
z =( x,y) ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+ at e =( u,st) ∈ E iﬀ












(ii) for all i ∈ N and all z0
i ∈ [0, ¯ x] × R+,i fui (z0




i ≥ pyyi − pxst
ixi.
The set of eﬃciency prices for z at e is denoted by ∆P (e,z).
We deﬁne implementability by sharing mechanism as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. A Pareto subsolution ϕ is triply labor sovereign imple-
mentable, if there exists a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈ G such that:
(i) Γm`x
g (resp. Γx`m
g ) triply implements ϕ on E in Nash, strong, and sub-
game perfect equilibria;
(ii) g is forthright:f o ra l le =( u,st) ∈ E and all (x,y) ∈ ϕ(e),t h e r ee x i s t s
p ∈ ∆P (u,st,x,y) such that (p,st,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(p,st,x,y)=y,
where p =( pi)i∈N with pi = p for all i ∈ N;
(iii) for all e =( ui,s t
i)i∈N ∈ E,i f(p,s,x,w) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(p,s,x,w)=
y,w h e r ep =( pi)i∈N with pi = p ∈ ∆P (u,st,x,y) for all i ∈ N, x =( xi)i∈N,



















for all i ∈ N and all (pi0,s 0
i,x 0
i,w 0
i) ∈ ∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+;
(iv) for all e =( ui,s t
i)i∈N ∈ E,i f(p,s,x,w) ∈ NE(g,e),t h e n(p,s0,x,w) ∈
NE(g,e) and g(p,s,x,w)=g(p,s0,x,w) whenever si = s0
i for all i ∈ N
with xi > 0.
9Deﬁnition 3 (ii) was ﬁrst introduced by Dutta et al. (1995) and discussed
by Saijo et al. (1996). It requires that if a strategy proﬁle is consistent with a
ϕ-optimal allocation, then it is a Nash equilibrium and the outcome coincides
with the ϕ-optimal allocation. That is, any ϕ-optimal allocation should be
realizable as an equilibrium outcome in a straightforward way.
Deﬁnition 3 (iii) requires a kind of informational eﬃciency of the mecha-
nism. It says that in equilibrium, each agent’s attainable set is included in
a half space, which is included in the lower contour set of the agent’s utility
function when the equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient. The point is that
this half space is deﬁned only by the information on the production point and
the production possibility set. Owing to this condition, the mechanism coor-
dinator does not need to know all the information on the agents’ preferences
in order to obtain ϕ-optimal allocations as equilibrium allocations.
Deﬁnition 3 (iv) is another requirement of informational eﬃciency. It
says that the distribution of output by the mechanism would not change
regardless of any change in skill information stated by “non-working” agents.
That is, unexercised labor skills should be equally taken into account in
the determination of distribution. Owing to this condition, the mechanism
coordinator need not consider degenerative labor skills.
We introduce two axioms as necessary conditions for labor sovereign im-
plementation. The ﬁrst axiom requires that any ϕ-optimal allocation should
remain ϕ-optimal if the proﬁle of the utility functions changes, without the
Pareto eﬃciency of this allocation being aﬀected. It is a condition of infor-
mational eﬃciency, because it only requires local information on individuals’
preference orderings.
Supporting Price Independence (SPI) (Yoshihara (1998), Gaspart (1998)).
For all e =( u,st) ∈ E and all z ∈ ϕ(e), there exists p ∈ ∆P (e,z) such that
for all e0 =( u0,st) ∈ E, if p ∈ ∆P (e0,z),t h e nz ∈ ϕ(e0).
Let ∆SPI (u,s,z) ≡
©
p ∈ ∆P (u,s,z):∀u0 ∈ Un s.t. p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,z), z ∈
ϕ(u0,s)}.
The second axiom requires that any ϕ-optimal allocation should remain
ϕ-optimal if the labor skills of non-working agents in this allocation change,
without the Pareto eﬃciency of this allocation being aﬀected. In addition,
this axiom is also a condition of informational eﬃciency, because it admits
ignorance of the information on the skills of non-working agents.
Independence of Unused Skills (IUS). For all e =( u,st)=( ui,s t
i)i∈N ∈
10E and all z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ϕ(e),t h e r ee x i s t sp ∈ ∆P (e,z) such that for all
e0 =( u,st0)=( ui,s t0
i )i∈N ∈ E where st
i = st0
i for all i ∈ N with xi > 0, if
p ∈ ∆P (e0,z),t h e nz ∈ ϕ(e0).
Let ∆IUS(u,s,z) ≡
©
p ∈ ∆P (u,s,z):∀s0 ∈ Sn s.t. p ∈ ∆P (u,s0,z), z ∈ ϕ(u,s0),
where s0
i = si for all i ∈ N with xi > 0},w h e r ez =( xi,y i)i∈N.
Furthermore, the two axioms can be interpreted in terms of responsibil-
ity and compensation (Fleurbaey (1998)) in fair allocation problems. The
axiom SPI represents a “stronger” condition of responsibility, because it re-
quires independence of the particular change of individuals’ utility functions
which are interpreted as responsible factors.12 It is “stronger” because SPI
is stronger than Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin (1999)), which was seen as a
relatively strong axiom of responsibility by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996).
In contrast, the axiom IUS can be interpreted as a weaker condition of com-
pensation, because it requires independence of the particular change of in-
dividuals’ labor skills, which are interpreted as non-responsible factors. It
is “weaker” because IUS is weaker than the axiom of Independence of Skill
Endowments (Yoshihara (2003)), which was seen as a relatively weak axiom
of compensation.
N o t et h a taP a r e t os u b s o l u t i o nϕ satisﬁes SPI and IUS if and only if for
all e ∈ E,a l lz ∈ ϕ(e),t h e r ee x i s tp ∈ ∆SPI (e,z) and p0 ∈ ∆IUS(e,z) .I n
general, ∆SPI (e,z) 6= ∆IUS(e,z). However, there exists some intersection
between the two sets as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 0: Let ϕ satisfy SPI and IUS. Then, for all e =( u,st) ∈ E and all
z ∈ ϕ(e), ∆SPI (u,st,z) ⊆ ∆IUS(u,st,z).
Proof. Given (u,st) ∈ E,l e tz =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ϕ(u,st) and p ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,z).







be such that p ∈ ∆P (u,st0,z).I f z ∈ ϕ(u,st0),t h e nb y
the deﬁnition of ∆IUS,w eh a v et h a tp ∈ ∆IUS(u,st,z).
Let u∗ =( u∗
2,u−2),w h e r eu∗
2(x,y)=( x − x)

































→∞as α → 0,w h i c h
guarantees the desired result from the intermediate value theorem. Thus, u∗
2
12Note that there is another axiom closely related to SPI, Local Independence (Nagahisa
(1991)), although it is applied only to economies with diﬀerentiable utility functions.
11is compatible with Assumption 1.A s∆P (u∗,st,z)={p} and ϕ satisﬁes
SPI, z ∈ ϕ(u∗,st) and ∆SPI (u∗,st,z)={p}.C o n s i d e rm o v i n gf r o m(u∗,st)
to (u∗,st0).F r o m t h e d e ﬁnition of u∗, ∆P (u∗,st0,z)={p}.A s ϕ satis-
ﬁes IUS, z ∈ ϕ(u∗,st0) and ∆IUS(u∗,st0,z)={p}.C o n s i d e r m o v i n g f r o m
(u∗,st0) to (u,st0).A sp ∈ ∆P (u,st0,z) and ϕ satisﬁes SPI, z ∈ ϕ(u,st0).
SPI and IUS are necessary conditions for the labor sovereign triple im-
plementation.
Theorem 1. I faP a r e t os u b s o l u t i o nϕ is triply labor sovereign imple-
mentable,t h e nϕ satisﬁes SPI.
Theorem 2. I faP a r e t os u b s o l u t i o nϕ is triply labor sovereign imple-
mentable,t h e nϕ satisﬁes IUS.
Next, we show that SPI and IUS together are suﬃcient for labor sovereign
implementation. First, to construct our mechanism, let us introduce two
mechanisms, deﬁned as follows:
• gw is such that for each st ∈ Sn and each strategy proﬁle (p,s,x,w) ∈
4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn










if xi = µ(x−i) and
wi > max{f (
P
sk¯ x), maxj6=i {wj}},
0 otherwise,





• gs is such that for each st ∈ Sn a n de a c hs t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (p,s,x,w) ∈
4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn







kxk) if xi =0 , wi =0 ,a n dsi >s j for all j 6= i,
0 otherwise.
The mechanism gw ∈ G assigns all of the produced output13 to only one
agent who provides the maximal interior amount of labor time and reports a
maximal amount of demand for the output, where µ(x−i) is a scheme to have
agents ﬁnd their best response strategies. The mechanism gs ∈ G assigns all
13Note that we implicitly assume that the mechanism coordinator can hold all of the
produced output after the production process, although he may not monitor that process
perfectly.
12of the produced output to only one agent who demands no putput, reports
the highest labor skill, and does not work at all.




u ∈ Un :( x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s) and p ∈ ∆SPI (u,s,x,w)
ª
.G i v e np ∈ ∆ and
(s,x,w) ∈ Sn×[0, ¯ x]
n×Rn
+,l e tN (p,s,x,w) ≡ {i ∈ N : ∃(x0
i,w 0









Given a strategy proﬁle (p,s,x,w) such that pi = p for all i,a na g e n ti ∈
N (p,s,x,w) is called a “potential deviator. ”L e tu sd i s c u s st h em e a n i n go f
“potential deviators.” Consider ϕ(p,s,x,w)
−1 = ∅ and N (p,s,x,w) 6= ∅.
The ﬁrst equation implies that the strategy proﬁle (p,s,x,w) is inconsistent
with the solution ϕ. The second equation N (p,s,x,w) 6= ∅ implies that
there is an agent i who can change his strategy to another one (pi,s i,x 0
i,w 0
i)







with ϕ.T h a t i s , i t m a y b e t h i s a g e n t i who makes the current strategy
proﬁle (p,s,x,w) inconsistent with ϕ. This means that i ∈ N (p,s,x,w) is
a “potential deviator.”
We propose a feasible sharing mechanism g∗ ∈ G that works in each given
st ∈ Sn as follows:
For any (p,s,x,w)=( pi,s i,x i,w i)i∈N ∈ 4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+,





kxk),t h e n
1-1: if there exists p ∈ ∆ such that pi = p for all i ∈ N and ϕ(p,s,x,w)
−1 6=
∅,t h e ng∗ (p,s,x,w)=w,
1-2: if there exists j ∈ N such that for some p ∈ ∆, pi = p for all i 6= j,
ϕ(pj,s,x,w)


































1-3: f o ra n yo t h e rc a s e ,g∗ (p,s,x,w)=gw (p,s,x,w),
Rule 2: if f (
P
skxk) 6= f (
P
st
kxk),t h e ng∗ (p,s,x,w)=gs (p,s,x,w).
It is easy to see that g∗ satisﬁes forthrightness (Saijo et al. (1996)) and the
best response property (Jackson et al. (1994)). Moreover, it is a price-quantity
type, and so it is self-relevant (Hurwicz (1960)). In addition, it is feasible.
13Note that the total amount of output f (
P
st
kxk) is observable at the end
of the production process, even without the true information on labor skills,
because the coordinator can hold all of the produced output.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (p,s,x,w) ∈ 4n×Sn×[0, ¯ x]
n×Rn
+ is called ϕ-consistent
if for some p ∈ ∆, pi = p for all i ∈ N and ϕ(p,s,x,w)
−1 6= ∅. Given a strat-
egy proﬁle (p,s,x,w), g∗ w o r k sa sf o l l o w s :F i r s t ,g∗ computes the expected
amount of output f (
P




kxk). Suppose that these two values coincide. Then, if the




accordance with w under Rule 1-1. If (p,s,x,w) is not ϕ-consistent, and
there is a unique potential deviator, then g∗ punishes the agent according to





kxk), g∗ assigns the same
value as gw under Rule 1-3. If f (
P
skxk) 6= f (
P
st
kxk),t h e ng∗ assigns the
same value as gs under Rule 2.
We brieﬂy explain how the mechanism g∗ induces true information on la-
bor skills at least for working agents, and how it attains desirable allocations,
in the following parts (A) and (B), respectively:
(A) g∗ distributes the total amount f (
P
st
kxk) of output among agents ac-
cording to the agents’ supplies of labor time x, reported price vectors p,
reported labor skills s, and demands for the output w. The problem is that
the agents’ true labor skills are not observable and they may misrepresent
their labor skills to increase their share of output. To solve this problem,
a scheme of reward and punishment is set up in the mechanism as follows.
First, if f (
P
skxk) 6= f (
P
st
kxk), then clearly s 6= st holds, and there must
be at least one agent, say j ∈ N, who has misrepresented his labor skill,
sj 6= st
j, and supplied a positive amount of labor time xj > 0. Then, this
agent is deﬁnitely punished under the application of Rule 2.





kxk) but s 6= st.
Then, there are at least two agents who have misrepresented their labor skills
while supplying positive amounts of labor time, or someone, say j,h a sc h o -
sen “non working” while misrepresenting his labor skill. Let us put aside the
latter case for the moment. In the former case, suppose that one such misrep-
resenting agent, say j ∈ N, changes from xj > 0 to x0
j =0 , while reporting






















.I n t h i s
case, j may be better oﬀ under the application of Rule 2. Thus, the case
may not correspond to an equilibrium situation. The following lemma actu-
14ally conﬁr m st h i si n s i g h t .
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism
g∗ ∈ G be given as above. Given an economy (u,st) ∈ E, let a strategy proﬁle
(p,s,x,w) ∈ 4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+ be a Nash equilibrium of the game





kxk). Then, it follows that si = st
i
for all i ∈ N with xi > 0.
(B) We still need to explain how the mechanism implements the Pareto
subsolution ϕ when all agents report their true labor skills, s = st.T o d o
this, we adopt a scheme developed by Yoshihara (2000a).
As s = st,t h es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (p,s,x,w) ∈ 4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+
corresponds only to Rule 1. Note that among the three subrules of Rule
1, only Rule 1-1 can realize a desirable allocation in equilibrium, while the
other two are to punish agents who have deviated from the situation of Rule
1-1. Suppose that (p,s,x,w) is ϕ-consistent. Then, (x,w) becomes the
o u t c o m ef r o mR u l e1 - 1 ,w h i c hi saϕ-optimal allocation for some economy
with s = st. However, this does not necessarily imply that (x,w) is ϕ-
optimal for the actual economy. If (x,w) is not Pareto eﬃcient for the
actual economy, (x,w) should not be an equilibrium allocation. Rule 1-2
is necessary for solving this problem: if (p,s,x,w) corresponds to Rule 1-1
and results in the allocation (x,w), any agent is able to beneﬁt from another
consumption vector on the budget line, determined by a supporting price at
(x,w), by deviating to induce Rule 1-2. Therefore, if (x,w) is an equilibrium
allocation, then (x,w) must be Pareto eﬃcient.
We are ready to discuss the full characterizations of labor sovereignty
triple implementation by examining the performance of g∗.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, if a Pareto subsolution ϕ satis-
ﬁes SPI and IUS, then ϕ is triply labor sovereign implementable by g∗.
Note that this result does not depend upon the number of agents: any Pareto
subsolution satisfying SPI and IUS can be triply implementable by g∗ even
in economies of two agents.
Corollary 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, a Pareto subsolution ϕ is triply
labor sovereign implementable if and only if ϕ satisﬁes SPI and IUS.
15Note that even if any agent i can control his contribution by selecting e si ∈
[0,s t
i], Corollary 1 remains robust. In such a situation, the observable to-
tal amount of output is given not by f (
P
st
kxk), but by f (
P
e skxk),w h e r e
e sk ∈ [0,s t
k] for any k ∈ N. Then, the coordinator can still compare the
expected amount f (
P
skxk) with f (
P
e skxk),a n dt h e r ei sn od i ﬃculty in g∗
functioning.
From Corollary 1, we gain two new insights on the implementability of
Pareto subsolutions in production economies with unequal skills. First, we
can classify which solutions remain implementable, if the proﬁle of labor skills
becomes unknown to the coordinator, compared with the situation when the
proﬁl ew a sk n o w nt ot h ec o o r d i n a t o r . N o t et h a ti ti se a s yt os e et h a ta n y
Pareto subsolution is labor sovereign implementable if and only if it satisﬁes
SPI, whenever the labor skills are known to the coordinator. Second, because
the two axioms, SPI and IUS, can be seen as the axioms of responsibility and
compensation, Corollary 1 indicates that the implementable solutions should
have a rather strong property on responsibility, and a rather weak property
on compensation.
4 Characterizations
By applying Corollary 1, let us examine which Pareto subsolutions are im-
plementable. First, we discuss the three variations of the Walrasian solution:




as o l u t i o nϕW is Walrasian if for any e =( u,st) ∈ E, z ∈ ϕW (e) implies
that there exists p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆ such that:















Deﬁnition 5 (Roemer and Silvestre (1989, 1993)). A solution ϕPR is the
proportional solution if for any e =( u,st) ∈ E, z ∈ ϕPR(e) implies that:
(i) z is Pareto eﬃcient for e;







Deﬁnition 6 (Roemer and Silvestre (1989)). As o l u t i o nϕEB is the equal
beneﬁts o l u t i o nif for any e =( u,st) ∈ E, z ∈ ϕEB (e) implies that:
16(i) z is Pareto eﬃcient for e;
(ii) there exists an eﬃciency price p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆ for z at e =( u,st) ∈ E








From Yoshihara (2000), all three solutions above are known to satisfy SPI.
Thus, to conﬁrm the implementability, it suﬃces to examine IUS. Then:
Lemma 6. The Walrasian solution ϕW satisﬁes IUS.
Lemma 7. The proportional solution ϕPR satisﬁes IUS.
Lemma 8. The equal beneﬁt solution ϕEB satisﬁes IUS.14
Thus, all three solutions above are implementable by sharing mechanisms.
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, ϕW is triply labor sovereign
implementable.
Corollary 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, ϕPR is triply labor sovereign
implementable.
Corollary 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, ϕEB is triply labor sovereign
implementable.
Is there any non-Walrasian type of allocation rule that is implementable?
To discuss this, let us consider the following types of allocation rules:
Deﬁnition 7 (Yoshihara (2000a)). Let λ ∈ [0,1]. Then, a solution ϕλER is
the λ-eﬀort-reward solution if for any e =( u,st) ∈ E, z ∈ ϕλER(e) implies:
(i) z is Pareto eﬃcient for e;













The solution ϕλER is well deﬁned for any λ ∈ [0,1],a c c o r d i n gt oY o s h i -
hara (2000a). In addition, it satisﬁes the equal-reward-for-equal-labor-time
(EREL) principle (Kranich (1994)). It is easy to see that ϕλER satisﬁes SPI
for any λ ∈ [0,1].M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eϕλER distributes output completely inde-
pendently of skills, it is obvious that ϕλER satisﬁes IUS for any λ ∈ [0,1].
Thus:
14The proof of Lemma 8 w o u l db eav a r i a t i o no ft h a to fLemma 6.
17Corollary 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, for any λ ∈ [0,1], ϕλER is
triply labor sovereign implementable.
As ϕλER is not a variant of the Walrasian rules, but an equitable allocation
rule in terms of EREL, Corollary 5 indicates the existence of equitable and
implementable Pareto subsolutions.
L e tu sc o n s i d e ra l l oc a t i o nr u l e st h a tm e e tt h eequal-opportunity-for-budget-
set (EOB) principle. Van Parijs (1995) argued that this principle was a con-
dition for the basic income policy. The EOB principle may have the following
formulation:
Set-inclusion Undomination (SIU).15 For all e =( u,st) ∈ E and all















i,z i) ≡ {(x,y) ∈ [0, ¯ x] × R+ : pyy − pxst
ix ≤ pyyi − pxst
ixi}.
Note that Pareto eﬃciency and SIU are compatible. For instance, the e u-
reference welfare equivalent budget solution (Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996))
is a Pareto subsolution satisfying SIU. In addition, such a solution is desirable
in terms of responsibility and compensation. However, any Pareto subsolu-
tion satisfying SIU cannot be implementable, as shown in the following:
Corollary 6. Any Pareto subsolution satisfying SIU is not triply labor
sovereign implementable.
In summary, the above characterizations give us a new insight on im-
plementation of Pareto subsolutions in production economies. It has been
already shown by Dutta, et. al (1995), Saijo, et. al (1999), and Yoshihara
(2000), under the implicit assumption that the production skills of agents
are known to the coordinator, that the three variations of the Walrasian
types are implementable by natural mechanisms, whereas the no-envy and
eﬃcient solution is not implementable. In this paper, we have seen that
the three variations of the Walrasian types and ϕλER are implementable by
sharing mechanisms even if the skills of agents are private information. In
contrast, any Pareto subsolution satisfying SIU cannot be implementable
once the skills are private information. Among such unimplementable so-
lutions, note that the e u-reference welfare equivalent budget solution can be
15Note that van Parijs (1995) formulated the EOB principle as Undominated Diversity
(Parijs (1995)), which is stronger than SIU.
18implementable by sharing mechanisms whenever the skills are known to the
coordinator, because it satisﬁes SPI.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We characterized implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies
with unequal labor skills. The class of Pareto subsolutions implementable
by sharing mechanisms is characterized by two axioms, Supporting Price
Independence and Independence of Unused Skills. Based upon this charac-
terization, we found that the Walrasian, proportional, equal beneﬁt, and λ-
eﬀort-reward solutions were implementable, whereas any Pareto subsolution
satisfying Set-inclusion Undomination failed to be implementable if individ-
uals’ labor skills were unknown to the coordinator. This result indicates the
impossibility of implementing a Pareto subsolution that provides every agent
with the equal opportunity for budget sets, whenever labor skills are private
information.
The workability of our proposed feasible sharing mechanism depends on
two implicit but reasonable assumptions: ﬁrst, although every individual i’s
labor performance, sixi,m e a s u r e di ne ﬃciency units, is imperfectly observ-
able and unveriﬁable by the coordinator, his working time, xi, is perfectly
observable. Second, despite such imperfect observability, the coordinator can
observe the real amount of outputs produced in the economy, so that he can
compare this amount with the expected amount of outputs based on the
announcements of the individuals. We believe that these implicit assump-
tions are reasonable enough to formulate the essential aspect of informational
asymmetry in production economies. However, it is open discussion whether
implementation of Pareto subsolutions by natural mechanisms in production
economies with possibly unequal labor skills holds without these implicit
assumptions.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that a Pareto subsolution ϕ is triply labor
sovereign implementable. Then, there exists a feasible sharing mechanism g ∈
G that satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iv) in Deﬁnition 3. For any z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈
19[0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+ and any e =( ui,s t
i)i∈N, e0 =( u0
i,s t0
i )i∈N ∈ E where st
i = st0
i
(∀i ∈ N),s u p p o s et h a tz ∈ ϕ(e) and that there exists a price p ∈ ∆P (e,z)∩
∆P (e0,z). From (ii), (p,st,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(p,st,x,y)=y,w h e r e
p =( p)i∈N, st =( st





















i) ∈ ∆×S×[0, ¯ x]×R+.A sp ∈ ∆P (e0,z), this implies (p,st,x,y) ∈
NE(g,e0) and (x,y) ∈ NA(g,e0). Hence, z ∈ ϕ(e0) by (i).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Suppose that a Pareto subsolution ϕ is triply la-
bor sovereign implementable. Then, there exists a feasible sharing mech-
anism g ∈ G that satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iv) in Deﬁnition 3. For any
z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+ and any e =( ui,s t
i)i∈N, e0 =( u0
i,s t0
i )i∈N ∈ E,
where ui = u0
i for all i ∈ N and st
i = st0
i for all i ∈ N with xi > 0, sup-
pose that z ∈ ϕ(e) and that there exists a price p ∈ ∆P (e,z) ∩ ∆P (e0,z).
From (ii), (p,st,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(p,st,x,y)=y,w h e r ep =( p)i∈N,
st =( st
i)i∈N, x =( xi)i∈N,a n dy =( yi)i∈N, which implies (p,st0,x,y) ∈





















i) ∈ ∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+.A s p ∈ ∆P (e0,z),t h i si m p l i e st h a t
(p,st0,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e0) and (x,y) ∈ NA(g,e0). Hence, z ∈ ϕ(e0) from
(i).
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that there exists j ∈ N with sj 6= st
j and













> 0 with s0
j > maxi6=j {si}, x0



































































































Hence, there is j ∈ N (s,x) with y0
j ≥ yj.N o t et h a tf o rx0




j,y j) ≥ uj(xj,y j) holds, and uj(x0
j,y 0
j) >u j(x0
j,y j) if yj =0by Assump-
tion 1, whereas uj(x0
j,y j) >u j(xj,y j) if yj > 0 from the strict monotonicity
of uj. Hence, agent j has an incentive to change from xj to x0
j =0to obtain
y0
j.T h u s ,(p,s,x,w) does not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism
g∗ ∈ G be given as above. Then, g∗ implements any Pareto subsolution ϕ
satisfying SPI and IUS on E in Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolution satisfying SPI and IUS. Let e =
(u,st) ∈ E be given.
(1) First, we show that ϕ(e) ⊆ NA(g∗,e).L e tz =( x,y) ∈ ϕ(e).L e tt h e
strategy proﬁle be (p,st,x,y)=( pi,s t
i,x i,y i)i∈N ∈ (∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+)
n
such that pi = p for all i ∈ N,w h e r ep ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,z). Then, g∗ (p,st,x,y)=












∈ ∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+. Note from Assumption 1 and the









=0 ,t h e nt h e
deviation provides no reward to j.
As every i 6= j truly reports his skill, s0
j = st
j is necessary to induce some
subrule of Rule 1 with x0
j > 0. That is, the deviation cannot induce Rule 1-3
as long as x0
j > 0, which is a necessary condition for the deviator to consume a











=0 .I nf a c t ,i fx0
























,w h i c h
contradicts the fact that Rule 2 is induced.
21Suppose that the deviation induces Rule 1-2. If x0























, which implies that
j cannot gain from his deviation. Let x0
j =0 . The application of Rule
1-2 implies that there exist x00
j and w00


















































which again implies that j cannot gain from his deviation.























yi.T h u s ,z ∈ P (e) implies that there is no
additional beneﬁtf o rj.
(2) Second, we show that NA(g∗,e) ⊆ ϕ(e).L e t(p,s,x,w)=( pi,s i,x i,w i)i∈N ∈
NE(g∗,e).
Suppose that (p,s,x,w) induces Rule 2. If N0 (x) ≡ {i ∈ N : xi =0 } =
∅,t h e ng∗




ixi holds. Then, (n − 1) · (
P




which contradicts the fact that Rule 2 is induced. Thus, there exists at














> 0 under Rule 2 by s0
j > max{si}i∈N, x0
j =0 ,a n d
w0
j =0 .








is such that s0







then the agent obtains all f (
P
st
kxk) under Rule 2. Thus, if #N0 (x) ≥ 2,
then such a strategy proﬁle cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium under Rule
2.















, which contradicts the fact that Rule 2 is in-














0 under Rule 2 by s0
j > max{si}i∈N, x0
j =0 ,a n dw0
j =0 .
Let #N0 (x)=1with N0 (x)={i} and #N\N0 (x)=1with N\N0 (x)=










































Thus, if #N0 (x)=1 ,s u c has t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle cannot constitute a Nash equi-
librium.
Suppose that (p,s,x,w) induces Rule 1-2 or 1-3. Then, there exists
j ∈ N such that g∗
j (p,s,x,w)=0 .F o rt h i sj, sj = st
j or xj =0by Lemma
1. Thus, if j deviates to x0
j > 0 and s0
j = st
j, then the agent induces either














































, and an appropriate x0
j.B y
t h es a m et y p eo fd e v i a t i n gs t r a t e g y ,j obtains a positive amount of output
when (p,s,x,w) is such that Rule 1-3 applies.
Thus, (p,s,x,w) should be such that Rule 1-1 applies, and g∗ (p,s,x,w)=
w. Then, there exists u0 ∈ Un such that p ∈ ∆SPI (u0,s,x,w) where
pi = p for all i ∈ N.M o r e o v e r ,p ∈ ∆P (u,st,x,w) and (x,w) ∈ P (u,st),
because otherwise, some j has an incentive to deviate to Rule 1-2. Let
(u0,s0) ∈ E be such that s0
i =m i n {si,s t
i} for each i ∈ N with xi =0
and s0
i = si (= st
i by Lemma 1) for every i ∈ N with xi > 0.F i r s t , f r o m
the deﬁnition of s0, (x,w) ∈ P (u0,s) implies (x,w) ∈ P (u0,s0). Hence,
from IUS, (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s) implies (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s0). Next, from the de-
ﬁnition of s0, (x,w) ∈ P (u,st) implies (x,w) ∈ P (u,s0).N o t e h e r e p ∈
∆SPI (u0,s,x,w)∩∆P (u0,s0,x,w) and p ∈ ∆P (u,st,x,w)∩∆P (u,s0,x,w).
Thus, from SPI, (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s0) implies (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s0). Finally, as
(x,w) ∈ P (u,st) and s0
i = st
i for all i ∈ N with xi > 0, (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s0)
implies (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,st) from IUS.
Lemma 3: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism
g∗ ∈ G be given as above. Then, g∗ implements any Pareto subsolution ϕ
satisfying SPI and IUS on E in strong equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolution satisfying SPI and IUS. Let e =
(u,st) ∈ E be given. As NA(g∗,e)=ϕ(e), we have only to show that
23NA(g∗,e) ⊆ SNA(g∗,e). Suppose that there exists (p,s,x,w) ∈ NE(g∗,e)


























holds for all j ∈ T. Note that (p,s,x,w) is such that Rule 1-1 applies and
g∗ (p,s,x,w)=w,a si ss h o w ni nt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a2 .M o r e o v e r ,(x,w) ∈
P (u,st).
From the construction of g∗, there is at most one agent who obtains a
positive amount of output under Rules 1-2, 1-3, and Rule 2. Thus, from



























Hence, the supposition of the deviation by T contradicts (x,w) ∈ P (u,st).
Thus, NA(g∗,e) ⊆ SNA(g∗,e).
Lemma 4: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism
g∗ ∈ G be given as above. Then, Γx`m
g∗ implements any Pareto subsolution ϕ
satisfying SPI and IUS on E in subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolution satisfying SPI and IUS. Let e =













First, we show that in every second-stage subgame, there is at least one











.L e tms∗ :[ 0 , ¯ x]
n → ∆n ×S n × Rn
+ be such





, ms∗ (x)=( p,s,w),w h e r e
















k¯ x)+2 ) otherwise.





.N o t et h a tg∗ (p,s,x,w) corresponds to
Rule 1-3. As pi =( 0 ,1) for all i ∈ N, no individual can induce Rule 1-






















24Moreover, if any i ∈ N can induce Rule 2 by deviating his strategy, then
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a txi > 0, which implies that this deviation is not
beneﬁcial for i.F i n a l l y ,i fa n yi ∈ N can deviate to induce Rule 1-3 again,
then such a deviation does not give the agent any additional beneﬁt, because
the individual i who has xi = µ(x−i) is already ﬁx e di nt h eﬁrst-stage game.






Now, we show that for this e =( u,st) ∈ E,i fb z =( b x,b y) ∈ ϕ(e),t h e n
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose corresponding outcome is






(1) In Stage 1, every individual i supplies b xi.
(2) In Stage 2, the agents have ms :[ 0 , ¯ x]
n → ∆n ×S n × Rn
+ such that
ms (x)=( p,s,w),w h i c hi sd e ﬁned as follows:
(2-1): if x = b x in Stage 1, then for any i ∈ N, ms
i (x)=( pi,s i,w i)=( p,st
i,b yi)
where p ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,b x,b y);
(2-2): if x = b xx0
j,w h e r ex0





































k¯ x)+2 ) otherwise,
where p ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,b x,b y);
(2-3): in any other case, ms (x)=ms∗ (x).
















o ft h ec a s e( 2 - 3 ) ,a sw eh a v ea l r e a d ys h o w n .






.A ss = st, if an agent deviates to induce Rule 2, then he
has to supply a positive amount of labor time, which implies that the devia-
tion is not beneﬁcial for the agent by the construction of Rule 2. For all i 6= j,
let xi 6= µ(x−i) in (2-2). Then, g∗ (p,s,x,w) corresponds to Rule 1-2. No
i 6= j can induce Rule 1-1. Nor can any agent other than j consume a positive





¢−1 = ∅ for
any (x0
i,w 0
i) ∈ [0, ¯ x]×R++.M o r e o v e r ,n oi 6= j can consume a positive output
under Rule 1-3, because xi 6= µ(x−i). In contrast, j can deviate to induce


















j − b xj
¢
,
because p ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,b x,b y). When Rule 1-2 is induced by j,h i so u t p u tc o n -



















Moreover, if j deviates to induce Rule 1-3, then he has no positive output
consumption.
Let there exist i 6= j with xi = µ(x−i) in (2-2). Then, g∗ (p,s,x,w)
corresponds to Rule 1-3. Any deviation cannot induce Rule 1-1, because
pj =( 0 ,1) and pi =( 1 ,0).A g e n tj’s deviation to induce Rule 1-2 results in
g∗
j (p,s,x,w)=0 ,b e c a u s epi =( 1 ,0) for i 6= j and ϕ((1,0),s,x,w)
−1 = ∅
for any (s,x,w).T h e s a m e i s t r u e f o r i.M o r e o v e r , i f a n y j ∈ N induces
Rule 1-3 by changing his strategy, then such a deviation does not give the
agent any additional beneﬁt, because the individual i who has xi = µ(x−i) is













. In accordance with (1)-(2-1) of (b x,ms),t h eo u t c o m ei s
(b x,b y). Suppose that some j has an incentive to deviate from b xj to x0
j 6= b xj





































Lemma 5: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let the feasible sharing mechanism
g∗ ∈ G be given as above. Then, Γm`x
g∗ implements any Pareto subsolution ϕ
satisfying SPI and IUS on E in subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolution satisfying SPI and IUS. Let e =













First, we show that in every second-stage subgame, there exists at least











.L e t :
I (p,s,0,w) ≡
½










Let xs∗ : ∆n×Sn×Rn
+ → [0, ¯ x]




, xs∗ (p,s,w) ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n is deﬁned as follows. For all i ∈ N:
26(i) if si = st
i and ∃p s.t. pj = p for all j ∈ N and i =m i nI (p,s,0,w),t h e n
xs∗
i (p,s,w)=x0






(ii) if si = st
i, wi >f (
P
sk¯ x),a n d∃p s.t. pj = p (∀j 6= i) and i ∈
N (p,s,0,w),t h e n
xs∗

























(iii) if si = st
i,w i > max{f (
P
sk¯ x),maxj6=i {wj}},a n d





Note that g∗ (p,s,xs∗ (p,s,w),w) corresponds to one of the subrules of Rule
1, because xi =0for all i with si 6= st






. To simplify the notation, let us use x∗ to denote
xs∗ (p,s,w) in the following discussion.
As xi =0for all i with si 6= st
i, if any agent deviates to induce Rule 2,
then he has to supply a positive amount of labor time. This implies that
such a deviation is not beneﬁcial for the agent from the construction of Rule
2.
Suppose that g∗ (p,s,x∗,w) corresponds to Rule 1-1. Then, as (p,s,w) is
already ﬁxed, no unilateral deviation from x∗ can induce Rule 1-1. Moreover,
wi ≤ f (
P
sk¯ x) for any i when g∗ (p,s,x∗,w) corresponds to Rule 1-1, which
implies that no individual would gain under Rule 1-2 or Rule 1-3.
Suppose that g∗ (p,s,x∗,w) corresponds to Rule 1-2. Then, we ﬁrst show
that there exists a unique agent j ∈ N who selects (ii) of the strategy mapping
xs∗
j , whereas any other i 6= j selects (iv) of the strategy xs∗
i .F r o m t h e
deﬁnition of Rule 1-2, there exists j ∈ N (p,s,x∗,w) for p = pi (∀i 6= j),
which implies wi ≤ f (
P
sk¯ x) for any i 6= j.T h u s ,n o i 6= j can select (ii)
and (iii) of xs∗
i under Rule 1-2. In addition, when g∗ (p,s,x∗,w) corresponds
to Rule 1-2, no agent should select (i) of xs∗
i .T h u s ,a n yi 6= j should select
(iv) of xs∗
i ,w h e r e a sj ∈ N (p,s,x∗,w) should select (ii) of xs∗
j so as to induce
Rule 1-2. In this strategy proﬁle, no i 6= j c a ng a i nb ya n yd e v i a t i o nt oi n d u c e
Rules 1-2, 1-3, or 2. In addition, as wj >f(
P
sk¯ x),n oi 6= j can induce
Rule 1-1. Furthermore, j ∈ N (p,s,x∗,w) cannot induce Rule 1-1 by any
deviation, because wj >f(
P







, the agent cannot induce Rule 1-3. Finally, j cannot
gain by deviation to induce Rule 1-2. Thus, having (ii) of xs∗
j is the best
response for j ∈ N (p,s,x∗,w), which implies that xs∗ is a Nash equilibrium.




i =0for any i 6= j,o rx∗
i =0for all i ∈ N.I n b o t h





. In the latter case, any i selects (iv) of
xs∗
i , and there is no other better strategy for i on his labor choice, given
(p,s,w) and x∗
−i = 0−i.I nt h ef o r m e rc a s e ,x∗
j = x
2 is the best response for
j ∈ N to x∗
−j = 0−j. In fact, j ∈ N cannot induce Rules 1-1 or 1-2, but
he cannot gain by any deviation to Rule 2, given x∗




−{i,j} = 0−{i,j},n oi 6= j can gain by any deviation
to Rules 1-3 or 2. In addition, i cannot induce Rules 1-1 or 1-2, because
wj >f(
P









even if p = pk (∀k 6= i).






Now, we show that for e =( u,st) ∈ E,i fb z =( b x,b y) ∈ ϕ(e),t h e n
there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose corresponding outcome is






(1) In Stage 1, every individual i reports (pi,s i,w i)=( p,st
i,b yi),w h e r ep ∈
∆SPI (u,st,b x,b y).





with pi = p for all i ∈ N is the action













k¯ x), is the action proﬁle in Stage 1, then for this j ∈ N:





































6=( p,b yj) and w0
j ≤ f (
P
st











,w h e r epi = p for all i 6= j and
s0
j 6= st
j, is the action proﬁle in Stage 1, then for this j ∈ N, xj = x
2,a n df o r
all i 6= j, xi =0 ;
(2-5): in any other case, xs (p,s,w)=xs∗ (p,s,w).






wi ≤ f (
P
sk¯ x) for any i ∈ N, and no deviator can obtain a positive amount






subgame of (2-5), as we have already shown. Moreover, we see that for the












sponds to (2-2). In this case, no agent can induce Rules 1-1 or 2. Moreover,
no i 6= j can obtain a positive amount of output under Rules 1-2 or 1-3,
because wi = b yi ≤ f (
P
sk¯ x). Finally, j cannot induce Rule 1-3 simply by











corresponds to (2-3), g∗ (p,s,x,w) corresponds to
Rule 1-3, because x = x, where no agent can obtain a positive output con-
sumption from Rule 1-3. In this case, some unilateral deviation may induce
Rules 1-2 or 1-3, but it is not beneﬁcial for any i ∈ N because wi ≤ f (
P
sk¯ x).












sponds to (2-4). In this case, any x0
j > 0 induces Rule 2 again and x0
j =0
makes the total output zero. Thus, j cannot obtain a positive output con-
sumption in any case. As for i 6= j,a n yx0
i 6= xi induces Rule 2 again, but
the deviation does not bring any additional beneﬁtf o ri, because xi =0and
x0






Show that the above strategy proﬁle (1)-(2) constitutes a subgame perfect











, g∗ (p,s,x,w)=g∗ ((p)i ,st,b x,b y)=b y. Suppose that some j





in Stage 1. Then,





















. This contradicts b z ∈







with sj 6= s0
j in Stage 1. Then from (2-4), the agent cannot






Proof of Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 1 hold. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolu-
tion satisfying SPI and IUS. From Lemmas 2, 3, 4, and 5, Γm`x
g∗ (resp. Γx`m
g∗ )
triply implements ϕ on E in Nash, strong, and subgame perfect equilibria.
Moreover, g∗ is forthright, as is shown in the former half of the proof of
Lemma 2. Thus, it suﬃces to show that g∗ meets (iii) and (iv) of Deﬁnition
3.
1. Deﬁnition 3 (iii). The latter half of the proof of Lemma 2 shows that if
(p,s,x,w) ∈ NE(g∗,e), then Rule 1-1 applies and g∗ (p,s,x,w)=w.F o r
any i ∈ N and any (pi0,s 0
i,x 0
i,w 0






















































,w h e r ep = pk for













Consider case (ii). As from Lemma 2, (x,w) ∈ ϕ(e) and p ∈ ∆SPI (u,s,x,w)








i = si = st
i.T h u s , s0

























is such that Rule 2
applies, then x0








=0 .T h u s , g∗
meets Deﬁnition 3 (iii).
2. Deﬁnition 3 (iv). Note again that if (p,s,x,w) ∈ NE(g∗,e),t h e ni ti s
such that Rule 1-1 applies, or there exists u ∈ Un such that (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s)
and for all i ∈ N, pi = p ∈ ∆SPI (u,s,x,w).M o r e o v e r ,i f(x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s)
for some u ∈ Un,t h e np ∈ ∆P (u,s,x,w) implies that for any s0 ∈ Sn such
that s0
i = si for all i ∈ N with xi > 0,t h e r ee x i s t ss o m eu0 ∈ Un such
that p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,x,w) ∩ ∆P (u0,s0,x,w).B y S P I , (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u,s) and
p ∈ ∆P (u,s,x,w) ∩ ∆P (u0,s,x,w) together imply (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s).B y
IUS, (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s) and p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,x,w) ∩ ∆P (u0,s0,x,w) together
imply (x,w) ∈ ϕ(u0,s0).T h u s , (p,s0,x,w) is such that Rule 1-1 applies.
Hence, g∗ (p,s0,x,w)=g∗ (p,s,x,w)=w,a n d(p,s0,x,w) ∈ NE(g∗,e).
6.3 Proofs of Lemmas in Section 4
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .Let (u,st) be an economy such that (x,y) ∈ ϕW (u,st).
Let p =( px,p y) be a competitive equilibrium price corresponding to (x,y) at
(u,st). Suppose that the economy (u,st) changes to (u,st0) so that st0
i = st
i for
all i ∈ N with xi > 0, but still p ∈ ∆P (u,st0,x,y). Then, by the deﬁnition
of eﬃciency prices and the strict monotonicity of utility functions, it holds
that:









(ii) for all i ∈ N, zi ∈ arg max
(x,y)∈B(p,st0
i ,zi,θi)
ui (x,y) where B (p,st0
i ,z i,θi) ≡
©
(x,y) ∈ [0, ¯ x] × R+ : pyy − pxst0





. Therefore, (x,y) ∈
ϕW (u,st0).T h u s ,ϕW satisﬁes IUS.
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 .Let (u,st) be an economy such that (x,y) ∈ ϕPR(u,st).
30Let p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆P (u,st,x,y). Suppose that the economy (u,st) changes
to (u,st0) so that st0
i = st
i for all i ∈ N with xi > 0 but still p ∈ ∆P (u,st0,x,y).
Then, as (x,y) ∈ ϕPR(u,st) and st0
j = st
j for all j ∈ N with xj > 0,f o r
























yj.T h e r e f o r e ,(x,y) ∈ ϕPR(u,st0).T h u s ,ϕPR satisﬁes IUS.
Proof of Corollary 6. Let ϕ be a Pareto subsolution satisfying SIU. Let
(u,st) be an economy such that z ∈ ϕ(u,st),w h e r exi =0for some i ∈ N.
W.l.o.g., suppose that ϕ satisﬁes SPI. Let p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆SPI (u,st,z) and
for any j ∈ N, B (p,st













i > mink∈N {st
k | k ∈ N},t h e nc o n s i d e r(u,st0) such that:
st0
i =m i n k∈N {st
k | k ∈ N} and st0
−i = st
−i.L e t mink∈N {st
k | k ∈ N} = st
j.
Then, p ∈ ∆P (u,st0,z), but B (p,st0





.T h u s ,z / ∈ ϕ(u,st0),
which implies that ϕ dose not satisfy IUS.
If st
i ≤ mink∈N {st
k | k ∈ N}, then consider (u,st0) such that
st0
i > mink∈N {st
k | k ∈ N}\{st
i} and st0
−i = st
−i. In addition, consider u0 ∈ Un
such that p ∈ ∆P (u0,st0,z). Then, p ∈ ∆P (u0,st,z), which implies that z ∈
ϕ(u0,st), because ϕ satisﬁes SPI. Note that there exists mink∈N {st
k | k ∈ N}\{st
i} =
st
j. Then, B (p,st0





,s ot h a tz / ∈ ϕ(u0,st0).A s p ∈
∆P (u0,st0,z),t h i si m p l i e st h a tϕ dose not satisfy IUS.
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